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THE CORPORATE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT’S
ILLUSORY RIGHT TO TRIAL:
A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
JOHN N. GALLO* & DANIEL M. GREENFIELD**
INTRODUCTION
As in civil lawsuits, corporate criminal liability for federal crimes is
imposed using the respondeat superior standard: corporations are
criminally liable for the wrongdoing of their agents as long as the act is
committed within the scope of the agent’s authority and with the intent
to bestow at least some benefit to the corporation.  For decades, schol-
ars and practitioners have argued that imposing the tort concept of
respondeat superior liability on corporations for purposes of criminal
prosecution is not only practically ineffective but also, as a matter of
theory, inconsistent with fundamental principles of moral culpability.
The low threshold for corporate criminal liability—which,
although abandoned in some state jurisdictions, stubbornly persists
within the federal common law—combined with the threat of being
debarred or excluded from contracting with the federal government
upon conviction, has all but closed the criminal courthouse door to
sizable corporations in the United States.  With the knowledge that
such companies must avoid trial except in the most extreme circum-
stances, the Department of Justice, itself wary of the market fallout that
can accompany the successful prosecution of a large corporation, has
turned to enforcing the criminal code against companies through non-
prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements.
To date, most scholarly contributions in this field have addressed
the shortcomings of each component of the current regime—i.e.,
respondeat superior liability, prosecutorial guidelines as a de facto liabil-
ity standard, exclusion or debarment, and the enforcement of the crim-
inal law through privately negotiated contracts—on an individual basis.
The purpose of this Article is to connect the dots between these compo-
nents of the corporate criminal regime, and to illustrate how they,
taken together, infringe corporations’ right to mount a defense in the
criminal courts.
Part I of this Article describes the federal criminal justice system,
from the perspective of corporate entities, as it exists today.  This
* Partner, Sidley Austin LLP. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1986. Assistant United
States Attorney 1989-1993; Deputy Chief, Criminal Division, 1995-1996.
** Associate, Sidley Austin LLP.  J.D., Northwestern University School of Law,
2008. The authors wish to thank Sidley Austin LLP Associates Karim Basaria and Jason A.
Cairns for their invaluable assistance. The views expressed in this Article are exclusively
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of Sidley Austin LLP and its
partners.
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includes discussions of both the corporate criminal liability and debar-
ment and exclusion regimes, which together contribute to the current
imbalance of power between prosecutors and corporations.
Part II discusses how that imbalance and the government’s disincli-
nation to go to trial due to potential collateral consequences have given
rise to deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements, which
enable prosecutors to exact significant financial penalties and promises
to modify business practices in exchange for refusing to bring a crimi-
nal indictment.  The proliferation of these agreements effectively turns
individual federal prosecutors into ad hoc regulatory agencies that mete
out punishment without substantial congressional or judicial oversight.
The prevalence of such out-of-court agreements also hinders the devel-
opment of judicial precedent in the area of corporate criminal liability.
Part III begins with a brief discussion of some of the more influen-
tial proposals for reforming the current regime.  Part III then sets forth
this Article’s proposals for reform: (1) limiting corporate criminal lia-
bility to cases in which the current common law elements are satisfied—
i.e., a corporation’s agent’s actions were within the scope of his or her
duties and intended, at least in part, to benefit the corporation—and at
least some member of senior management possessed the mens rea set
forth in the underlying criminal statute; (2) allow an affirmative
defense that would protect the corporate defendant from criminal lia-
bility where the defendant is able to show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that its senior management maintained and oversaw a robust
compliance program designed to prevent the type of conduct charged;
and (3) ensure that corporations always have a meaningful opportunity
to challenge agency decisions to debar or exclude.
I. THE CURRENT REGIME
A. The Common Law Rule: Respondeat Superior
The standard for proving corporate criminal liability developed as
courts “struggled to overcome the challenge of assigning criminal
blame to fictional entities in a legal system designed to address individ-
ual culpability.”1  Before the early part of the nineteenth century, cor-
porations, viewed as artificial creatures of the state, could not be held
criminally liable.
However, in 1909, the United States Supreme Court decided New
York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company v. United States, a case in
which federal prosecutors convicted a railroad company based on the
conduct of an assistant traffic manager who violated federal law while
acting within the scope of his employment.2  On appeal to the Supreme
Court, the railroad argued that the provision of the law imposing vicari-
ous criminal liability was unconstitutional because it “deprived the cor-
1. Michael Viano & Jenny R. Arnold, Corporate Criminal Liability, 43 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 311, 312 (2006).
2. New York Central v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 490–92, 498 (1909).
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poration of the presumption of innocence . . . .”3  The Court rejected
these arguments, citing policy considerations:
[W]e see no good reason why corporations may not be held
responsible for and charged with the knowledge and purposes of
their agents, acting within the authority conferred upon them.  If
it were not so, many offenses might go unpunished and acts may
be committed in violation of law where, as in the present case, the
statute requires all persons, corporate or private, to refrain from
certain practices, forbidden in the interest of public policy.4
The Court noted further that “the great majority of business trans-
actions in modern times are conducted through” the corporate form
and, accordingly, that permitting such entities to evade responsibility
for the illegal actions of its agents and employees “would virtually take
away the only means of effectually controlling [them].”5  Thus, as a
means of giving effect to its policy preference, the Court relied upon
the doctrine of respondeat superior liability, imported from tort law, to
affirm the conviction:
Applying the principle governing civil liability, we go only a step
further in holding that the act of an agent, while exercising the
authority delegated to him . . . may be controlled, in the interest
of public policy, by imputing his acts to his employer and impos-
ing penalties upon the corporation for which he is acting . . . .6
This wholesale appropriation “forever changed the complexion of
business crime prosecution and ushered in an age when government
prosecutors would assume the role of regulators of commerce, manu-
facturing, and markets.”7
Vicarious liability is a form of secondary liability that arises when a
relationship, such as agency, forms the basis for imposing liability on
the defendant for the infringing acts of another.8  The doctrine of
respondeat superior, also known as the “Master-Servant Rule,” is a com-
mon-law form of vicarious liability that holds a master liable for the
torts of a servant that occur while the servant is acting within the scope
of his employment.9  This rule is based on the notion that the
employer, who profits from the employee’s activities, should also share
the losses caused by those activities.10  Notwithstanding the fact that
respondeat superior has its origin in tort law, which functions primarily
to compensate a party for damage caused by another, since the
Supreme Court’s holding in New York Central, courts have utilized it to
3. Id. at 492.
4. Id. at 494–95.
5. Id. at 495–96.
6. Id. at 494.
7. Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking
Prosecutorial Pressure on Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 61 (2007).
8. William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability under the Federal Securities Laws—Aiding
and Abetting Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and Agency: Common-Law Principles and the Statu-
tory Scheme, 14 J. CORP. L. 313, n.28 (1989).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
10. Knutson v. Morton Foods, Inc., 603 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex. 1980).
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impute both the guilty act, or actus reus, and the mental state, or mens
rea, of a corporate agent to his or her corporate employer.
Under respondeat superior, corporate criminal liability attaches to
conduct when a corporation’s employee’s or agent’s actions are (1)
within the scope of his or her duties and (2) intended, at least in part,
to benefit the corporation.  The first requirement is met if the
employee had actual or apparent authority to engage in the act in ques-
tion.11  An employee acts with actual authority where the corporation,
either “expressly or implicitly, gave the agent” authority to act on its
behalf.12  Apparent authority attaches if a third party reasonably
believes the agent has authority to perform the act in question.13  The
second element requires that the employee perform the action in ques-
tion to benefit the corporation.  Significantly, however, the corporation
need not have actually received any benefit for criminal liability to
attach;14 as long as it was the employee’s intention to bestow benefits
upon the corporation, the employee’s conduct can be imputed to the
corporate defendant.  Furthermore, providing benefit to the corpora-
tion need not have been the employee’s primary motivation in engag-
ing in illegal activity—a corporation may be found criminally liable
even where the miscreant employee acts primarily for his or her own
personal gain.15
The doctrine of respondeat superior can expose the corporate
defendant to criminal liability even where (a) the criminal behavior was
perpetrated by a low-level, rogue employee; (b) the criminal conduct is
undertaken without the knowledge of upper-level management; (c) the
employee was explicitly instructed by the corporation not to engage in
the conduct; (d) the conduct directly violated established company pol-
icy; (e) there was no actual benefit to the corporation; (f) the company
had a robust compliance program in place at the time of the offense;
11. See, e.g., United States v. Inv. Enter. Inc., 10 F.3d 263, 266 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[A]
corporation is criminally liable for the unlawful acts of its agents, provided that the con-
duct is within the scope of the agent’s authority, whether actual or apparent.”).
12. Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 85 (3d Cir. 1960).
13. See Joel M. Androphy et al., General Corporate Criminal Liability, 60 TEX. B.J. 121,
121–22 (1997) (discussing actual and apparent authority).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th Cir.
1985) (“[B]enefit is not a ‘touchstone of criminal corporate liability; benefit at best is
evidential, not an operative fact.’  Thus, whether the agent’s actions ultimately
redounded to the benefit of the corporation is less significant than whether the agent
acted with the intent to benefit the corporation.”); Standard Oil Co. of Tex. v. United
States, 307 F.2d 120, 129 (5th Cir. 1962) (noting that if an employee acts to benefit the
corporation, “[t]he act is no less the principal’s if from such intended conduct either no
benefit accrues, a benefit is indiscernible, or, for that matter, the result turns out to be
adverse.”).
15. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 770 F.2d at 407 (upholding corporation’s conviction
where corporation’s agents acted “at least in part” to benefit corporation).  However, acts
committed by employees that are expressly contrary to the interests of the corporation
and for which the corporation derives no benefit cannot subject the corporation to crimi-
nal liability. Standard Oil Co. of Tex., 307 F.2d at 129 (reversing defendant Standard Oil’s
conviction because agents’ criminal acts were intended to defraud company and were for
benefit of a third party).
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and (g) the conduct was exposed by the compliance program.16  In
sum, the current regime requires virtually no nexus between the action
and intention of the agent and the corporation.  Once there is evidence
that an employee engaged in criminal activity on the job, the criminal
case against the company may be “virtually bulletproof.”17
Reliance on respondeat superior liability in the corporate criminal
context was a pragmatic approach at the turn of the twentieth century.
“In the absence of both regulatory agencies and a significant system of
public enforcement of civil and administrative law, the criminal law was
the bedrock of social control.”18  However, in light of the ascendance of
a state and federal regulatory framework, the present refusal to move
toward a more nuanced standard for corporate criminal liability cannot
be justified.
While respondeat superior liability may, at least theoretically, fur-
ther the deterrent goals of the criminal law, it does little to serve the
retributive functions.  With respect to deterrence, we write “theoreti-
cally” because the current regime’s imprecision makes it an awkward
instrument for discouraging corporate malfeasance.  Deterrence theory
holds that the threat of punishment may discourage criminal activity by
impacting the cost-benefit analysis in which a would-be criminal
engages prior to performing a prohibited activity.19  In other words, “to
justify [a] penalty on grounds of deterrence,” one must “[a]ssum[e] the
offender behaves in a rational way” and avoids illegal conduct under
circumstances where the risk of punishment overwhelms the potential
for reward.20  In the context of organizational liability, however, the
respondeat superior approach upsets this cost-benefit calculus because
it attaches criminal liability for conduct that even a diligent corporation
may not be able to prevent.
With respect to the latter penological purpose, retributive punish-
ment “appeals to notions of moral culpability or just deserts,” and thus
we impose criminal sanctions where “it is morally proper to punish that
person.”21  Yet respondeat superior liability fails to reflect this function
of the criminal law because it allows corporations to be found guilty
based on an individual employee’s conduct for which the company
itself cannot reasonably be considered morally responsible.  Notwith-
standing that “corporation criminal law wears the garment of vicarious
16. Lucian E. Dervan, Reevaluating Corporate Criminal Liability: The DOJ’s Internal
Moral Culpability Standard for Corporate Criminal Liability, 41 STETSON L. REV. 7 (2011);
Bharara, supra note 7, at 76.
17. Bharara, supra note 7, at 76; see also Andrew Weissman, A New Approach to Corpo-
rate Criminal Liability, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1319, 1320 (2007); Standard Oil Co. of Tex., 307
F.2d at 127 (“[A] corporation may be criminally bound by the acts of subordinate, even
menial, employees.”).
18. William S. Laufer & Alan Strudler, Corporate Intentionality, Desert, and Variants of
Vicarious Liability, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1285, 1295 (2000).
19. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561–62 (2005); Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 837 (1988).
20. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 445 (2008).
21. Developments in the Law—Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior through
Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1237, 1232 (1979).
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liability somewhat like an ill-fitting hand-me-down,” our legal system
continues to sacrifice legal coherence in exchange for what amounts to,
at best, marginal advances in preventing criminal conduct in a business
context.22
B. The De Facto System: Broad Prosecutorial Discretion as a Substitute
for Substantive Law
In practice, the respondeat superior liability standard authorizes
prosecutors to indict both individual wrongdoers and their corporate
employers, regardless of whether the corporation authorized,
approved, acquiesced, or was even aware of the criminal activity.  In
recognition of this grant of extraordinary discretion, the Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) has internally endeavored to prevent its own prosecu-
tors from pursuing criminal charges against a corporate entity without
first attempting to assess the culpability of the organization itself.23  The
guidance set forth in the “DOJ’s Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations” (“Principles”) reflects this perspective, and sets
forth nine factors designed to guide corporate criminal charging
decisions:
1. the nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of
harm to the public, and applicable policies and priorities, if any,
governing the prosecution of corporations for particular catego-
ries of crime;
2. the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, includ-
ing the complicity in, or the condoning of, the wrongdoing by
corporate management;
3. the corporation’s history of similar conduct, including prior
criminal, civil, and regulatory enforcement actions against it;
4. the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing
and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents;
5. the existence and adequacy of the corporation’s pre-existing
compliance program;
6. the corporation’s remedial actions, including any efforts to
implement an effective corporate compliance program or to
improve an existing one, to replace responsible management, to
discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to
cooperate with the relevant government agencies;
7. collateral consequences, including disproportionate harm to
shareholders, pension holders, and employees not proven per-
sonally culpable, as well as impact on the public arising from the
prosecution;
8. the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for
the corporation’s malfeasance; and
22. Bharara, supra note 7, at 63.
23. See Memorandum from Mark Filip, Dep. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Jus., to Heads
of Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS (2008), at 3–4, available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/readingroom/
dag-memo-08282008.pdf [hereinafter Filip Memo.].
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9. the adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory enforce-
ment actions.24
Indeed, the Principles and the commentary thereto recognize that
the respondeat superior standard fails to account for basic characteris-
tics of organizational behavior, corporate personhood, and entity culpa-
bility.25  For example, the Principles acknowledge that corporate
exposure to criminal liability is more appropriate where the misconduct
is “undertaken by a large number of employees” or “condoned by
upper management.”26  Prosecutors are also instructed that, “[a] his-
tory of similar misconduct may be probative of a corporate culture that
encouraged, or at least condoned, such misdeeds, regardless of any
compliance program.”27  Further, the Principles recognize that a prop-
erly enforced compliance program must inform any analysis of corpo-
rate culpability, advising that, “it may not be appropriate to impose
liability upon a corporation, particularly one with a robust compliance
program in place, under a strict respondeat superior theory for the sin-
gle isolated act of a rogue employee.”28
On paper, therefore, the Principles appear to mitigate much of the
harm caused by the respondeat superior liability regime.  That is, the
Principles seem to signal—notwithstanding the absence of a corrective
legislative rule or judicial holding— that the government has, in prac-
tice, “abandon[ed] the principles of vicarious liability” announced in
New York Central, and “replace[d] th[at] substantive law with permissive
guidance recognizing corporate personhood.”29
For several reasons, however, the Principles are not an adequate
substitute for legislative and judicial reform of the substantive law of
corporate criminal liability.  First, while the government’s consideration
of the Principles may be mandatory, they neither create legal rights for
corporate defendants nor are binding on federal prosecutors.30
Indeed, the United States Attorneys’ Manual, in which the Principles
are published, expressly disclaims any reliance on the guidelines con-
tained within the Manual as a defense at trial:
The Manual provides only internal Department of Justice gui-
dance.  It is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon
to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law
by any party in a matter civil or criminal.  Nor are any limitations
24. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNTIED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL: PRINCIPLES OF FED-
ERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (2008) [hereinafter, PRINCIPLES OF PROSE-
CUTION], §§ 9-28.300–1100, available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading
_room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm; see also Filip Memo., supra note 23, at 3–4.
25. See Filip Memo., supra note 23, at 3 (noting that “due to the nature of the corpo-
rate ‘person,’” corporate charging decisions require analysis of factors generally inappli-
cable to individuals).
26. PRINCIPLES OF PROSECUTION, at § 9-28.500.
27. PRINCIPLES OF PROSECUTION, at § 9-28.600 cmt.
28. PRINCIPLES OF PROSECUTION, at §§ 9-28.500.
29. Laufer & Strudler, supra note 18, at 63.
30. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, United States Attorneys’ Manual § 1-1.100 (updated
May 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/
title1/1mdoj.htm.
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hereby placed on otherwise lawful litigative prerogatives of the
Department of Justice.31
Second, as the Filip Memorandum—an internal DOJ document
authored to inform federal corporate charging decisions—and its pred-
ecessors, the Thompson and McNulty Memoranda, (collectively, “the
Memoranda”), emphasize, individual prosecutors retain significant
charging discretion notwithstanding the factors delineated in the Prin-
ciples: “In making a decision to charge a corporation, the prosecutor
generally has substantial latitude in determining when, whom, how, and
even whether to prosecute for violations of federal criminal law.”32
Thus, neither the Principles nor the Memoranda provide “the predict-
able guidance [ ]or the protection to the accused of a binding liability
standard.”33  Third, both the Filip Memorandum and those Memo-
randa it supersedes cite cases supporting the broad liability regime set
forth in New York Central and its progeny.34  In sum, the DOJ’s pro-
nouncements “present[ ] something of a paradox, given the attempt to
outline appropriate limitations on the exercise of discretion, while
simultaneously reserving the right to exercise the broadest possible dis-
cretion allowed under the law.  It is therefore an expression of untram-
meled power in theory, but also suggestive of reasonable restraint in
practice.”35
Given the breadth of discretionary power reserved in these docu-
ments, it is not difficult to see why defense attorneys take limited com-
fort in the nine factors set forth in the Principles or in cautionary
language contained within the Memoranda notwithstanding the lauda-
ble intentions of prosecutors at Main Justice and within the individual
branch offices.  Moreover, in the event a corporate defendant elects to
present a defense at trial, it is the respondeat superior standard that will
govern and form the basis for jury instructions, not the considerations
set forth in the Principles or the Memoranda.  Thus, prosecutorial self-
restraint alone does not—indeed, cannot—“provide the inherent or
legal protection against the problem of over inclusiveness that a genu-
ine theory of corporate culpability would provide.”36
31. See id.
32. Filip Memo., supra note 23, at 4; Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Dep.
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Jus., to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys, U.S. Dep’t
of Justice (2003), at 4, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business_organizations
.pdf [hereinafter Thompson Memo.]; Memo. from Paul J. McNulty, Dep. Att’y Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Jus., to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Att’ys, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (2006),
at 5, available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf [here-
inafter McNulty Memo.].
33. George R. Skupski, Note, The Senior Management Mens Rea: Another Stab at a Work-
able Integration of Organizational Culpability into Corporate Criminal Liability, 62 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 263, 296 (2011).
34. See Filip Memo., supra note 23, at 2–3 (citing cases); Thompson Memo., supra
note 32, at 2 (citing cases); McNulty Memo., supra note 32, at 3 (citing cases).
35. Bharara, supra note 7, at 79.
36. Jennifer Moore, Corporate Culpability Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 34
ARIZ. L. REV. 743, 761 (1992).
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Of additional concern, the discretionary de facto criminal liability
standard is economically inefficient.  First, legal uncertainty makes cor-
porate planning difficult.  That is, where “a corporation has no clear
sense of what employee crimes will be imputed to the entity or what
punishment those crimes might produce, the corporation will have dif-
ficulty properly allocating its resources.”37  Second, respondeat supe-
rior liability may “overdeter” legitimate corporate activity, “compelling
risk-averse corporations to steer employees away from borderline but
permissible conduct out of uncertainty over punishment.”38  What’s
more, the over- deterrence of legitimate business practices creates inef-
ficiencies without necessarily delivering a benefit to the public or the
corporation in exchange.  Typically, as in the case of rent ceilings, labor
laws, and tariffs, to name a few, we bargain efficiency in exchange for a
public benefit.  In this instance, however, the cost-benefit calculation
difficulty introduced by the respondeat superior corporate criminal lia-
bility regime begs the question of whether there is much public good to
be gained in the bargain.
In sum, unenforceable aspirations on the part of the prosecuting
entity fail to remedy fully the shortcomings in the common law test for
corporate criminal liability.  As one judge observed, “prosecutorial dis-
cretion is not an adequate substitute for statutes carefully drawn to pro-
hibit only conduct that deserves criminal punishment.  ‘Criminalize
them all and let the prosecutors sort them out’ is not a particularly
inspiring slogan for a penal code.”39
B. Debarment and Exclusion
The low threshold for criminal liability embodied in the federal
common law may render the chances of victory at a trial remote, even
for the good corporate citizen who made a genuine effort to prevent
the alleged malfeasance.  This, however, is just one feature of a broader
legal landscape that has narrowed the courthouse doors to large corpo-
rate defendants.  Beyond the liability threshold itself lay a number of
federal statutes and regulations that prohibit defendants found to have
engaged in criminal misconduct from contracting with or being reim-
bursed by the federal government.  Thus, not only is the morally blame-
less corporation faced with the very real risk of losing at trial, it also
may, pursuant to the federal debarment and exclusion provisions, be
subject thereafter to what is in effect a “corporate death penalty.”40  In
tandem with the respondeat superior liability, these consequences col-
lateral to a loss at criminal trial place the corporate criminal defendant
37. Erik Paulsen, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate Prosecution
Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1460 (2007).
38. Id. at 1449.
39. Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing “Discretionary Justice”,
13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 170 (2004) (emphasizing that the guidelines may be
changed at any time and are not subject to judicial review).
40. See Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-
Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1134
(2006).
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in a position “akin to so-called exceedingly vulnerable eggshell plaintiffs
in tort law” who, “subject as they are to market pressures, may not be
able to survive indictment, much less conviction and sentencing.”41
A corporation may be debarred or excluded in several ways.  First,
a corporation may be debarred at the discretion of a federal agency
pursuant to the Federal Acquisition Regulations.42  The purpose of this
type of debarment, commonly referred to as “administrative debar-
ment,” is not to punish corporations, but rather “to protect the Govern-
ment’s interest” by ensuring that agencies only deal with dependable
companies.43  Second, a corporation can be debarred pursuant to a
statute that mandates a convicted corporation be debarred.44  This is
known as “statutory debarment.”  The purpose of statutory debarment
is to promote compliance with the law and is therefore punitive in
nature.45  Finally, a corporation may be excluded from the participa-
tion in federal programs such as Medicare.46  While debarment or
exclusion determinations typically do provide the subject entity an
opportunity to appeal, the implicated review may not always be robust
or meaningful.
Debarment and exclusion can be catastrophic.  With an estimated
$535.3 billion spent in fiscal year 2010 alone, the United States govern-
ment is by far the largest buyer of goods and services in the world.47
While companies that do not depend on contracts with or reimburse-
ment by the federal government for their livelihood may be able to
weather a debarment or exclusion, for those corporations whose busi-
ness models revolve around federal contracts—e.g., those in the health
care space—exclusion or debarment may amount to a “corporate
‘death penalty’ . . . effectively ending the ability of the company to
remain in that regulated field.”48  Of course, as the 2002 collapse of
Arthur Andersen taught all too well, an agency decision to debar or
exclude may not only impact management, but also may lead to finan-
cial catastrophe for the corporation’s hundreds, thousands, or even
tens of thousands of employees, not to mention innocent stockholders,
41. Bharara, supra note 7, at 72.
42. 48 C.F.R. § 9.400 et seq.
43. 48 C.F.R. § 9.402(b).
44. See, e.g., the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7606(a) (“No Federal agency may enter
into any contract with any person who is convicted of any offense under section 7413(c)
of this title for the procurement of goods, materials, and services to perform such con-
tract at any facility at which the violation which gave rise to such conviction occurred if
such facility is owned, leased, or supervised by such person.”); see also 2 C.F.R.
§ 1532.1130(a) (“[Clean Air Act] . . . disqualifications are exclusions mandated by
statute.”).
45. KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34753, DEBARMENT AND SUSPEN-
SION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAW INCLUDING RECENTLY
ENACTED AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 2, 12 (2012).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b) (“The Secretary may exclude the following individu-
als and entities from participation in any Federal health care program.”).
47. Rena Steinzor & Anne Havermann, Too Big to Obey: Why BP Should Be Debarred,
36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 81, 111 (2011).
48. JAMES T. O’REILLY ET AL., PUNISHING CORPORATE CRIMES: LEGAL PENALTIES FOR
CRIMINAL AND REGULATORY VIOLATIONS 256 (2009).
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and, indeed, the public at large—even before such decision has been
finally reviewed.49
C. Corporate Compliance Programs: Too Little Too Late
Due to the untenable risk occasioned by those factors detailed
above and by costs incurred through follow-on collateral civil litigation,
most large corporations have instituted wide ranging and expensive
compliance programs aimed at ensuring that their employees do not
engage in criminal conduct.  However, due to Congress’s and the
courts’ unwillingness to incorporate a robust-compliance-program-
defense into the substantive criminal law, these initiatives have paid few
dividends to corporations seeking to defend themselves against allega-
tions of criminal conduct.  Because the respondeat superior liability
regime views such efforts as legally irrelevant, corporations with sincere,
first-rate compliance programs find themselves as defenseless at trial—
and by extension as vulnerable to debarment or exclusion—as corpora-
tions that encourage or make no genuine effort to curb malfeasance.50
Indeed, criminal courts routinely exclude from consideration by a jury
evidence concerning the existence of a compliance program.51
To be sure, the United States Sentencing Guidelines for Organiza-
tions (the “Guidelines”) recognize that a corporation’s commitment to
deter misconduct is a relevant factor for determining the degree of
punishment to which a corporate defendant should be subject follow-
ing conviction.  Any downward departure at sentencing, however, can
only palliate but never cure.  Sentencing consideration is too little too
late for the soon-to-be debarred or excluded corporation.  In the end,
the balancing efforts reflected in the Principles and the Guidelines fail
to resolve the fundamental problem: the respondeat-superior-liability
regime and the debarment and exclusion laws, together, may render a
criminal indictment fatal for many a large corporation.
49. See, e.g., Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur
Andersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 109 (2006) (noting that by the end of 2002,
only 3,000 of Arthur Andersen’s 85,000 employees remained at the company and that
“the public benefits generated by prosecuting [Arthur] Andersen criminally were mini-
mal or, if they existed at all, were exceedingly subtle”).
50. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1.
51. For example, in United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., the Ninth Circuit
upheld the district court judge’s decision to exclude from the jury evidence of the corpo-
rate defendant’s extensive compliance program, reasoning that the “program, however
extensive, does not immunize the corporation from liability when its employees, acting
within the scope of their authority, fail to comply with the law.”  United States v. Twenti-
eth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 660 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1021
(1990); see also United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 226 F.2d 745, 749 (3d Cir. 1955)
(approving jury instruction stating: “It does not matter that the specific acts involved were
not expressly authorized by the Corporation, nor is it material [that] the Corporation by
general policy or otherwise may have expressly instructed the officers and agents not to
perform the specific acts which were in fact done if acts were in the course of employ-
ment.”); C.I.T. Corp. v. United States, 150 F.2d 85, 90 (9th Cir. 1945) (holding that “it was
proper to exclude evidence that [the employee’s] . . . causing of the false statements was
contrary to the instructions to use care in their preparation”).
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II. THE RISE OF THE MANDATORY PUNISHMENT REGIME: DEFERRED AND
NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS
The characteristics of the corporate criminal law result in an unu-
sual state of affairs: neither a corporation nor a federal prosecutor has
an incentive to take a corporate criminal case to trial.  From the corpo-
ration’s perspective, respondeat superior may render remote the odds
of a not-guilty verdict.  From the prosecutor’s perspective, debarment
and exclusion upon conviction risk substantial injury to innocent third
parties—i.e., employees, stockholders, and consumers—and to the
national economy as a whole.  In recognition of this risk generally, and
specifically in the wake of criticism following the conviction and result-
ing collapse of Arthur Andersen, the DOJ has increasingly turned to
non-prosecution agreements (“NPAs”) and deferred prosecution agree-
ments (“DPAs”) as a means to enforce corporate criminal law.  While
preferable to the result for Arthur Andersen, this development itself
has collateral consequences.
NPAs embody the government’s agreement with a defendant not to
file criminal charges in exchange for compliance with negotiated condi-
tions during the term of the agreement, typically one to three years.
DPAs, in contrast, reflect the government’s agreement to defer prosecu-
tion of filed charges in exchange for complying with specified conditions
for a term of years, again, typically one to three years, at the expiration
of which the charges are dropped.  While in certain respects the differ-
ence is material, such differences are beyond the scope of this Article,
so for ease of reference we refer to DPAs and NPAs collectively as “N/
DPAs.”
Although corporate N/DPAs vary with the circumstances, they
reflect some combination and at times all of the following corporate
concessions in exchange for an agreement not to prosecute: (1)
acknowledgement that the government will, in fact, prosecute should
the agreement—in the government’s sole discretion—be breached;52
(2) an admission to specific conduct that, if subsequently admitted into
evidence upon breach of the agreement, effectively constitutes an
admission of guilt;53 (3) substantial cooperation from the corporation
in the investigation and subsequent prosecution of individual employ-
ees;54 (4) institution of extensive remedial programs, frequently with a
52. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 919
(2007) (“The vast majority of agreements (eighty-three percent) permit the DOJ, in its
sole discretion, to find an agreement has been breached and then pursue a
prosecution.”).
53. Id. at 867 (noting that admissions in the KPMG DPA “would have nearly cer-
tainly resulted in conviction” had DOJ prosecuted the company in the event of a breach
of the agreement).
54. Id. at 880–81 (noting that cooperation is essential in the investigation of corpo-
rate crime because “[o]rganizational prosecutions require a substantial investment due to
their complexity” among other reasons).
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robust and expensive monitoring component;55 and (5) substantial
financial penalties (of late often greater than nine figures).56
N/DPAs first came into wide use during the 1960s as a penologi-
cally-useful alternative to prosecuting first-time offenders and
juveniles.57  It was understood by social scientists at the time that such
individuals were more likely to be rehabilitated through an agreement
mandating reform than through conviction and incarceration with its
attendant collateral consequences.58
Then, in 1992, the DOJ and the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion began to investigate the Salomon Brothers brokerage house for
violations of the securities laws.59  After the company paid substantial
fines, instituted a robust compliance program, and undertook other far-
reaching remedial measures, the government declined to prosecute
it.60  And thus the era of the corporate N/DPA was born.61
As has been well-chronicled, the dramatic ascendance of the DPA
was non-linear.  While N/DPAs were employed sparingly in the 1990s
and early 2000s, their usage has exploded of late.62  Indeed, since 2010,
the government has entered into more than one hundred N/DPAs.63
It is no mystery why: both corporations and the government are virtu-
ally required to rely upon them in order to circumvent the unfairness
created by the combination of respondeat superior liability and the col-
lateral consequences of a conviction, including debarment and
exclusion.
From the perspective of the corporation, the mere announcement
by prosecutors that they are investigating a corporation can cause
extraordinary reputational and financial harm.64  That is, even the
“threat of indictment” is “a matter of life and death to many compa-
55. Id. at 863–64 (describing reforms required of KPMG in exchange for entering
into a DPA).
56. See, e.g., id. at 899 (2007) (noting that as of 2007, the average DPA fine was $141
million).
57. See, e.g., Allen R. Brooks, Comment, A Corporate Catch-22: How Deferred and Non-
Prosecution Agreements Impede the Full Development of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 7 J.L.
ECON & POL’Y 137, 147 (2010); Matt Senko, Note, Prosecutorial Overreaching in Deferred
Prosecution Agreements, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 163, 169 (2009); Benjamin M. Green-
blum, Note, What Happens to A Prosecution Deferred?  Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred
Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1866 (2005).
58. See, e.g., Greenblum, supra note 57, at 1866.
59. See, e.g., Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating The ‘New Regulators’: Current
Trends In Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 163–64 (2008).
60. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 57, at 149.
61. See, e.g., id. at 149; Greenblum, supra note 57 at 1872–73.
62. See, e.g., David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution Agreements
and the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV. 1295, 1311 (2013).
63. Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Federal Organizational Prosecution Agreements,
UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF L. (Apr. 10, 2014, 11:45 P.M.), http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/
prosecution_agreements/home?destination=home.suphp&order=field_date&sort=as. See
also Kristie Xian, Note, The Price of Justice:  Deferred Prosecution Agreements in the Context of
Iranian Sanctions, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 631, 633 (2014) (discussing
how how the U.S. government uses DPAs in context of Iranian sanctions).
64. See, e.g., F. Joseph Warin & Andrew S. Boutros, Deferred Prosecution Agreements: A
View from the Trenches and a Proposal for Reform, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 121, 129 (2007)
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nies.”65  Were indictment to follow, the damage could become irrepara-
ble as “[s]tock prices plummet, lines of credit dry up, and clients are
scared off.”66  A conviction, of course, can be a virtual death sentence
for a corporation: excluded or debarred from federal programs, mis-
trusted by consumers and suppliers, overlooked by investors, it may
cease to exist.67  These collateral consequences are so potent that they
have become “coercive forces” virtually rendering “the adversary system
a myth in the context of corporate criminal liability.”68  Thus to a cor-
poration, in most cases, an N/DPA may be the only way to survive
absent a prosecutorial declination.
For its part, the government, wary of precipitating the sort of collat-
eral damage that accompanied the Arthur Andersen conviction,
endeavors to punish corporate misconduct ex post while limiting the risk
of harm to innocent third parties such as shareholders, employees, and
other market participants.69  As one commentator has noted, “prosecu-
tors have their slingshot: they wield the threat of an indictment, which
results in potentially catastrophic collateral and reputational conse-
quences to a corporation,” but “it is a threat that prosecutors can ill
afford to carry out due to those consequences.”70  Moreover, the gov-
ernment believes that the N/DPA framework—which prioritizes evi-
dence of voluntary disclosure of misconduct and the aggressive
institution of compliance measures when determining whether to grant
a N/DPA—also provides a mechanism to incentivize appropriate corpo-
rate conduct ex ante.71
That both the government and the corporation are primarily inter-
ested in out-of-court resolution, however, does not render the parties
(noting that “[e]mpirical studies have shown that the mere announcement of a criminal
investigation triggers a significant drop in a company’s stock price”).
65. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (emphasis
added).
66. Paulsen, supra note 37, at 1456; see also Todd J. Canni, Shoot First, Ask Questions
Later: An Examination and Critique of Suspension and Debarment Practice Under the FAR, Includ-
ing a Discussion of the Mandatory Exclusion Rule, the IBM Suspension, and Other Noteworthy
Developments, 38 PUB. CONT. L.J. 547, 586–87 (2009); Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement,
Corporate Crime and Deterrence, 61 STAN. LAW REV. 271, 279–80 (2008).
67. See, e.g., Uhlmann, supra note 62, at 1310 (discussing the collapse of Arthur
Andersen LLP following its corporate prosecution by the DOJ).
68. Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Last Straw: The Department of Justice’s Privilege Waiver Policy
And The Death of Adversarial Justice in Criminal Investigations of Corporations, 57 DEPAUL L.
REV. 329, 338 (2008) (noting that the collateral consequences of conviction make it
“nearly impossible for public companies, especially those in regulated industries or those
who do significant business with the government” to go to trial).
69. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 52, at 880 (noting that in the wake of the Arthur
Andersen prosecution “prosecutors face great incentives to avoid an indictment that can
destroy a corporation and as a result harm employees, shareholders, and customers”).
70. Brandon L. Garrett, United States v. Goliath, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 105, 105
(2007).
71. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 52, at 887 (noting that the DOJ considers DPAs to a
be a “model” for “structural reform litigation”).
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equals at the bargaining table.72  The corporation, in contrast to the
government, may not survive an indictment, let alone a conviction.73
Indeed, as one student commentator aptly noted, “[t]he corporate
offender’s unique vulnerability to adverse publicity and collateral con-
sequences sets the stage for a deferral negotiation that stacks the decks
against the defendants and calls into question whether the choice to
enter into deferral is really a choice at all.”74  This imbalance of power
leaves prosecutors virtually unconstrained with respect to the severity
and breadth of concessions that they will exact from the corporation.75
That is, as Professor Brandon Garrett has noted, “prosecutors will typi-
cally have enormous negotiating leverage by threatening the ‘nuclear’
option of an indictment, and it shows in the terms of the agree-
ments.”76  Although at least in part born of a desire to provide a degree
of protection to corporations from the harsh respondeat superior and
debarment/exclusion framework, the N/DPA regime has, in effect,
become a mandatory punishment mechanism.
In response to criticism from lawmakers, corporate executives, the
criminal bar, and the federal courts, the government’s approach to
such agreements has evolved over time, but primarily at the margins.77
Although such changes have been welcome, they have done little to
address the fundamental imbalance of power between the government
and the corporation in this context.  That is, notwithstanding modifica-
tions to the government’s approach to granting N/DPAs, the corpora-
tion often still must agree to significant financial and remedial terms if
it is to continue to thrive.78
Nor have these reforms addressed the structural and normative
problems presented by reliance on N/DPAs as a means of policing cor-
porate conduct.  First, the discretionary nature of the form and scope of
N/DPAs places individual United States Attorney’s Offices, decentral-
ized throughout the nation,79 in the role of the ad hoc regulator, a task
72. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 70, at 108 (explaining that even though prosecutors
cannot “abide the collateral consequences of seeking convictions,” they still enjoy signifi-
cant leverage when negotiating DPAs).
73. See, e.g., Warin & Boutros, supra note 64, at 129 (noting that “companies may
not be able to weather the storm of an indictment” which is “likely” to bring “downgrad-
ing of creditworthiness, loss of market share, diminution of stock value, market and
reputational damage, [and] debarment from certain industries”).
74. Greenblum, supra note 57, at 1885.
75. See Warin & Boutros, supra note 64, at 123–24 (noting that prosecutors’ “unbri-
dled discretion . . . produces bizarre corporate criminal resolutions and DPA terms,
including terms that are seemingly unrelated to the company’s wrongdoing”).
76. Garrett, supra note 70, at 108.
77. See, e.g., Spivack & Raman, supra note 59, at 168–70 (discussing the Thompson,
McNulty, and Filip Memoranda, and noting that the DOJ’s approach to cooperation evi-
dence as a condition of granting DPAs has evolved through the years).
78. See, e.g., Warin & Boutros, supra note 64, at 122 (noting that “the addition of
DPAs to DOJ’s playbook has caused real and consequential economic, reputational and
(at times) life-changing harm to companies”).
79. See, e.g., Spivack & Raman, supra note 59, at 171–72 (explaining that “whether a
company is offered a DPA, and what the terms of that agreement are, could very likely
turn on the luck of the draw regarding which office happens to handle the prosecution”).
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better suited to centralized administrative agencies and the Congress.80
Moreover, regulations are designed to take into account the policy pref-
erences of all relevant stakeholders, not merely the policy preferences
of Main Justice or a single DOJ branch office.81  Similarly troubling
from a structural standpoint, DPAs remove judicial oversight from the
punishment of criminal offenders,82 a circumstance unfamiliar to the
American criminal justice system.
Second, the prevalence of DPAs retards the development of judi-
cial precedent relevant to corporate criminal liability.83  Usually, the
case law advances through an adversary process (notwithstanding the
ubiquity of plea agreements, which themselves are subject to a degree
of judicial supervision).  That is, through public trials and judicial
review, the law continuously develops.  However, the new N/DPA
regime represents a significant departure from this model.84  Instead of
reflecting the traditional norm-developing criminal adversary process,
N/DPAs are contracts privately negotiated by individual prosecutors on
one hand and individual private attorneys on the other hand, and typi-
cally are not subject to meaningful judicial review.  Thus, a body of cor-
porate criminal law does not develop as it otherwise might.85  As one
commentator has explained, N/DPAs “subvert” the development of
precedent by “preventing courts from analyzing legal and factual issues
and subsequently publishing judgments defining specific points of
law.”86  That the growth of the corporate criminal law is stunted as a
result of the N/DPA regime also deprives legislatures of “signaling” as
to gaps in the law.87
Without a growing body of case law, corporate actors are deprived
of judgments “clarify[ing] the boundaries of permissible legal conduct”
and thus are unable to tailor their conduct with precision.88  This com-
plication cannot be remedied through the examination of past N/DPAs
as a benchmark to gauge appropriate behavior for each United States
Attorney’s Office has significant discretion to enter into and negotiate
80. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 70, at 867 (noting that DPAs can “create industry-
wide effects in a regulatory manner”).
81. See, e.g., the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (2012) (explaining that
when a final rule or regulation may have a significant impact on a substantial number of
stakeholders, a regulatory impact analysis must be prepared and made available to the
public for their review and input).
82. See Uhlmann, supra note 62, at 1328 (observing that there is “little or no judicial
oversight of [DPAs]” but that judicial involvement “would help ensure the fairness of the
agreements and provide the accountability the public deserves”).
83. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 57, at 139; Paulsen, supra note 37, at 1455–56.
84. See, e.g., Greenblum, supra note 57, at 1865 (noting that “the corporate deferral
process . . . is currently an extrajudicial area of white collar crime prosecution”).
85. See, e.g., Uhlmann, supra note 62, at 1342 (noting that the government “erodes
corporate criminality by using deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements as a
substitute for criminal prosecution”).
86. Brooks, supra note 57, at 155.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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the terms of N/DPAs.89  From a penological perspective, this lack of
certainty is troubling.  First, corporations face the prospect of being
punished for conduct they did not recognize as prohibited.  Second, as
described above, this lack of clarity is also economically inefficient
because corporations must invest human and financial capital—that
could otherwise be put toward higher and better uses—into
“attempt[ting] to decipher the correct legal framework.”90
The rise of the N/DPA, while an understandable response to the
forces unleashed by a criminal regime organized around respondeat
superior liability and exclusion/debarment determinations, has intro-
duced additional complications without addressing root causes.  In the
end, those origins must be addressed; any other approach merely risks
inventing new problems.  After all, “if society truly believes that the
adversary system is the best and fairest way to test criminal charges when
individuals are in the government’s cross-hairs, it is not at all clear why
legal entities such as corporations should be denied its benefits.”91
III. PROPOSED REFORMS
A. Eliminate Respondeat Superior Liability as a Basis for Corporate
Criminal Liability and Incorporate a Robust Compliance
Program Affirmative Defense
Given the shortcomings of the respondeat superior liability stan-
dard, the collateral consequences of debarment and exclusion, and the
problems introduced by the N/DPA regime that ascended in response,
there is no shortage of proposals aimed at narrowing the standard for
corporate criminal exposure.92  Indeed, one oft-cited article com-
mences its discussion of the subject by stating, “We start with the pre-
mise that vicarious liability is an inferior rule for determining corporate
responsibility.”93  Others have criticized the current standard for
“wholly ignor[ing] a fundamental tenet of criminal jurisprudence pre-
sent in crimes applicable to individuals: moral culpability.”94  While a
detailed discussion of the merits and shortcomings of each proposal is
beyond the scope of this Article, observations regarding some of the
more influential proposals for reforming the current standard provide
context for the proposal set forth below.
In an influential and widely-cited article, Professor Pamela Bucy
argues that corporations have distinct and identifiable personalities—in
89. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 70, at 932–33; Warin & Boutros, supra note 64, at
122 (noting that the “DOJ has failed to provide guidelines to prosecutors on when to
employ a guilty plea, DPA, or NPA” and “[a]s a result, companies, shareholders, and
employees suffer from much needless and painful uncertainty”).
90. Brooks, supra note 57, at 156; see also Paulsen, supra note 37, at 1460–61.
91. O’Sullivan, supra note 68, at 338.
92. See, e.g., Lucian E. Dervan, Reevaluating Corporate Criminal Liability: The DOJ’s
Internal Moral Culpability Standard for Corporate Criminal Liability, 41 STETSON L. REV. 7
(2011); Bharara, supra note 7, at 63; Podgor, supra note 39, at 170 (emphasizing that the
guidelines may be changed at any time and are not subject to judicial review).
93. Laufer & Strudler, supra note 18, at 1298.
94. Dervan, supra note 92, at 9.
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her parlance, an “ethos”—and that only organizations with an ethos
that encourages employees or agents to commit criminal acts should be
held criminally accountable under the law.95  Professor Bucy advanced
the following eight factors for consideration in determining whether a
corporate ethos encouraged criminal conduct:
1. Was the corporation organized in a manner that encouraged
the criminal conduct?
2. Did goals set by the corporation encourage illegal behavior?
3. Were corporate employees educated about legal requirements?
4. Were legal requirements monitored?
5. Who was involved in the criminal conduct, and was it “recklessly
tolerated” by higher echelon officials?
6. How has the corporation reacted historically to both violations
of the law and individual violators?
7. Was legally inappropriate behavior incentivized by the corpo-
rate compensation policy?
8. Are there indemnification practices that encourage criminal
conduct?96
According to Professor Bucy, corporate criminal liability should
attach where these factors indicate that the corporation’s ethos
encouraged the employee’s or agent’s criminal conduct.
Reliance on a corporate-ethos analytical model for assigning crimi-
nal liability does not, however, adequately remedy the shortcomings of
the respondeat superior liability.  First, the corporate-ethos test over-
looks the mens rea standard contained within the particular criminal
statute at issue.  A statute’s mens rea standard reflects the legislature’s
judgment regarding the appropriate degree of “culpability required for
conviction.”97  The corporate-ethos approach ignores that legislative
determination by disregarding the difference between statutes subject-
ing corporate persons to liability based on, for example, criminal negli-
gence on one hand and willfulness on the other.
Second, the test calls on a finder of fact to consider multiple fac-
tors for purposes of making a culpability determination, but does not
describe the relative weight to accord each variable or define the
threshold required for a finding that the corporation is morally respon-
sible for the offense at issue.  Thus, from a practitioner’s perspective,
the corporate-ethos theory can be criticized as amounting to little more
than a “smell test.”98  That is, without familiar benchmarks or clear
principles guiding its application, the corporate-ethos test lacks the pre-
dictability that corporations and practitioners require of an effective lia-
bility standard.
The American Law Institute’s approach, codified as § 2.07(1)(c) of
the Model Penal Code (“MPC”), another influential alternative, pro-
95. Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal Liabil-
ity, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1099 (1991).
96. Id. at 1129–46.
97. Skupski, supra note 33, at 300.
98. Id.
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poses to limit corporate criminal liability to the following
circumstances:
[T]he commission of the offense was authorized, requested, com-
manded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of direc-
tors or by a high managerial agent acting on behalf of the
corporation within the scope of his office or employment.99
“High managerial agent” is defined by the MPC as an officer “or
any other agent of a corporation or association having duties of such
responsibility that his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the
policy of the corporation or association.”100  This approach is based on
the notion that the acts of higher-level agents are better “reflective of
the character of the corporate body.”101  Although § 2.07 does not itself
set forth a mens rea requirement, the MPC, unlike Professor Bucy’s
corporate-ethos approach, incorporates the mens rea requirement
from the underlying criminal statute.  Specifically, the MPC provides
that “a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposefully,
knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, as the law may require, with respect
to each material element of the offense.”102  Finally, the MPC provides
for an affirmative defense if a corporate defendant can show, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, “that the high managerial agent having
supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense
employed due diligence to prevent its commission.”103
Several state jurisdictions, either by statute104 or through common
law doctrine,105 have adopted the standard set forth in the MPC.
Others have announced that criminal liability for corporations is lim-
ited to those provisions where the legislature has expressly provided for
corporate criminal liability.106  Still others have adopted standards even
stricter than those set forth in the MPC.107  Thus, it is the minority of
99. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c).
100. Id.  § 2.07(4)(c).
101. WILLIAM S. LAUFER, CORPORATE BODIES AND GUILTY MINDS 11 (2006).
102. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (emphasis added).
103. Id. § 2.07(5).
104. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-305 (2004); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 45-2-311
(2009); ALASKA STAT. § 11-16-130 (2004).
105. See, e.g., State v. Smokey’s Steakhouse, Inc., 478 N.W.2d 361, 362 (N.D. 1991).
106. See, e.g., State v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 835 So. 2d 230, 233–34 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2000).
107. See, e.g., Com. v. Beneficial Finance Co., 275 N.E.2d 33 (Mass. 1971) (holding
that a corporation could be held liable for any criminal offense committed by an
employee who had been given the power by the corporation to handle the business
engaged in at the time of the criminal act); West Valley Estates, Inc. v. State, 386 So.2d
208, 209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that a corporation may be criminally liable
“for the acts of an agent who has been vested with the authority to act on behalf of the
corporation in the sphere of corporate business in which he commits the criminal act”);
State v. Adjustment Dep’t Credit Bureau, 483 P.2d 687, 691 (Idaho 1971) (adopting stan-
dard modeled after the Model Penal Code but refusing to adopt the respondeat superior
liability provision set forth in Model Penal Code § 2.07(1)(a)).  For a detailed discussion
of the law governing corporate criminal liability in each of the fifty states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, see Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting
Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the Arthur Andersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107,
126–42 (2006).
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state jurisdictions that have retained a form of respondeat superior lia-
bility in evaluating allegations of corporate criminal conduct.108  The
federal common law, however, stubbornly clings to that flawed regime.
This Article builds upon these and similar proposals for reform.
Specifically, an employee’s malfeasance should expose the corporation
to criminal liability only where the current common law elements are
satisfied and at least some member of senior management possessed the
mens rea set forth in the underlying criminal statute.  Our proposal also
incorporates an improved affirmative-compliance-program defense,
permitting the corporation to establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the body of individuals comprising senior management
maintained and oversaw a robust compliance program designed to pre-
vent the type of conduct charged.  Thus, under our proposal, the com-
plete liability standard would read as follows:
A corporation shall be criminally liable for the criminal acts of its
employees or agents when:
(1) the employee’s or agent’s criminal acts were
(a) within the scope of their duties, and
(b) intended to benefit the corporation; and
(2) at least some member of senior management—defined as
those individuals having substantial control over the corpora-
tion or a substantial role in the making of policy—possessed
the requisite mens rea.
It is an affirmative defense that the corporation establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that the body of individuals com-
prising senior management maintained and oversaw a robust com-
pliance program designed to prevent the type of conduct charged.
By limiting criminal liability to those circumstances where a member of
senior management possesses the requisite mens rea, this proposal lim-
its criminal liability to those instances where the corporation itself can
fairly be said to be guilty of misconduct.  In so doing, the proposal rem-
edies the respondeat superior deficiencies catalogued above.
The robust-compliance-program defense is also an improvement
upon the existing standard.  First, the affirmative defense would
encourage corporate self-regulation and good citizenship.  Second, the
affirmative defense shifts the evaluation of a corporation’s compliance
program away from prosecutors, who often have “little or no experi-
ence in corporate governance matters,” but nevertheless are “charged
with evaluating whether a company’s compliance program is ade-
108. See John M. Darley, Kevin M. Smith, & Paul H. Robinson, The Ex Ante Function
of the Criminal Law, 35 L. & SOC’Y REV. 165 (2001) (estimating that at least than 36 states
have adopted the MPC approach, at least in part); see, e.g., Sea Horse Ranch, Inc. v. Peo-
ple, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 681, 687 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (“[A] corporation may be criminally
liable for the conduct of its officer or agents or employees.”). But see Kathleen F. Brickey,
Rethinking Corporate Liability Under the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 593, 630 (1988)
(noting that only six of the twenty-one states that had adopted § 2.07 of the MPC had
recognized a due diligence defense to liability).
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quate.”109  The proposal set forth in this Article ensures that the effec-
tiveness of a corporation’s compliance program will be judged in the
public sphere by factfinders rather than within the individual United
States Attorney’s Offices.
While the reforms advanced by Professor Bucy and the MPC reflect
significant improvements upon the current state of the law, this propo-
sal provides additional and important benefits.  First, unlike Professor
Bucy’s model, which discounts the mens rea requirement set forth in
the underlying federal criminal statute, the proposal calls for fidelity to
duly enacted mental state requirements.  Second, the proposal avoids
the unnecessary implementation difficulties that could arise if
factfinders were forced to make culpability determinations under Pro-
fessor Bucy’s eight-factor corporate-ethos test.  Third, unlike the factors
set forth by Professor Bucy’s inquiry, which present a theoretical frame-
work for organizational culpability but no threshold for satisfaction, the
elements in our proposal call for the sort of factual inquiries familiar to
judges and juries.
By improving upon the scope of the affirmative defense available
to corporations maintaining robust compliance programs, our proposal
also offers an advantage over the MPC reforms.  Although the “due dili-
gence” affirmative defense proposed by the MPC represents a step in
the right direction, it remains inadequate.  First, it is unfortunate that
the MPC proposal is limited in the scope of its focus on only those
efforts made by “the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibil-
ity over the subject matter of the offense deployed.”110  Such an approach
reflects a somewhat antiquated view of corporations in which it is “easy
to trace responsibility for conduct from a lower-level worker to a mem-
ber of senior management whose oversight of employees can be
assessed to determine whether ‘due diligence’ was in fact exercised.”111
Because modern corporations typically contain several “layers of man-
agement and different lines of responsibility that often cut across prod-
uct and geographical lines,”112 a narrow inquiry into the due-diligence
efforts of specific supervisors, as opposed to senior management as a
whole, leaves the potential for corporations with robust compliance
programs to be stripped unfairly of an affirmative defense where a sin-
gle official fails to exercise appropriate oversight.  In contrast, our pro-
posal calls for an analysis of the compliance efforts of the corporation’s
senior management as a whole, thereby reflecting modern organiza-
tional realities.
109. Bharara, supra note 7, at 112; see also Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate
Compliance Programs as a Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47
RUTGERS L. REV. 605, 678–84 (1995).
110. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(5).
111. Peter J. Henning, Be Careful What You Wish For: Thoughts on a Compliance Defense
Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 883, 904 (2012). For a discussion of
the willful blindness standard under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, see generally
Christina M. Sindoni, Note, Global-Tech’s “Patent” Failure:  Why Congress Must Reverse the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’s Mens Rea After Global-Tech, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 605 (2014).
112. Henning, supra note 111, at 904.
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Of course, the liability-limiting proposals set forth in this Article do
not purport to eliminate every complication that may arise in evaluating
corporate conduct.  For example, under our framework it is necessary
in each case as a predicate matter to determine which individuals com-
pose senior management.  Given that corporate hierarchies and organi-
zational structures vary based on an entity’s size, industry, geographic
reach, and other factors, a bright-line standard drawing the line around
an appropriate senior management group for every case is not realistic.
For example, in a closely-held organization with only a handful of
senior managerial positions, focusing on only top-tier management
seems appropriate.  In contrast, with respect to a multinational corpora-
tion operating numerous autonomous divisions, all of which have multi-
ple subdivisions, tiers of high-level management, and profit centers, it
makes little sense to focus solely on the highest echelon of managers in
the parent corporation.  Ultimately, the inquiry here must strike a bal-
ance—on one hand, it must capture individuals that truly drive the cor-
poration’s behavior, while avoiding casting too small of a net; on the
other hand, we must not return to a watered-down vicarious liability
approach that would result if prosecutors were permitted to impute lia-
bility to corporate defendants based on the intent of individuals far
down the organizational ladder.
Some commentators have also expressed concern that instituting a
robust compliance affirmative defense might enable companies to
immunize themselves from liability by creating “sham” programs.113
But under this proposal, the defendant corporation would carry the
burden of proof.  And, in order to discourage organizations from seek-
ing to hide behind “cosmetic compliance” programs,114 the govern-
ment need only present evidence indicating that a program is, in
substance, inadequate.115
113. See Bharara, supra note 7, at 110–11 (citing Robert E. Bloch, Compliance Pro-
grams and Criminal Antitrust Litigation: A Prosecutor’s Perspective, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 223, 226,
229–30 (1988) (arguing against corporate compliance defense because it would provide
too much protection to misbehaving corporations); Samuel Buell, The Blaming Function of
Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 529 (2006) (suggesting that such an approach
“may be mostly a boon to compliance professionals” because “[a] firm might formalize
practices in part to mask that it does not really practice them”); William S. Laufer, Corpo-
rate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1372
(1999) (“[S]urvey research suggests that in some . . . corporations, the role of compliance
has more to do with maintaining the appearance of a compliant reputation than that of a
meaningful culture of ethical awareness and law abidance.”).  For a discussion on how
corporate culture affects white collar crime generally, see Cynthia A. Koller, Laura A.
Patterson & Elizabeth B. Scalf, When Moral Reasoning and Ethics Training Fail:  Reducing
White Collar Crime Through the Control of Opportunities for Deviance, 28 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETH-
ICS & PUB. POL’Y 549 (2014).
114. Garrett, supra note 52, at 890.  For example, Enron had a compliance program
entitled “Respect, Integrity, Communication, and Excellence,” which, despite the lofty
title, existed only on paper. Id.
115. Skupski, supra note 33, at 297.
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B. Ensure Meaningful Review of Debarment and Exclusion
Agency Determinations
As a further or alternative response to the inequities described
above, entities subject to debarment or exclusion should be afforded an
opportunity to engage in meaningful advocacy before any agency deter-
mination takes effect.  While the precise quantum of reform necessary
with respect to each individual statute and regulation is well beyond the
scope of this Article, as a general matter the provision of an opportunity
for robust challenge and meaningful review prior to the imposition of
debarment or exclusion in all but a handful of cases—e.g., those
presenting the threat of imminent, serious, and irreparable harm—
would “totally alter the underlying bargaining relationship between cor-
porations and prosecutions.”116  That is, in a regime where corpora-
tions could mount robust challenges to agency determinations and be
afforded meaningful review prior to the effective date of exclusion or
debarment, a corporation, no longer facing a significant risk of extinc-
tion upon conviction, could rationally choose to defend itself at trial
instead of submitting to the demands of a N/DPA.  With the knowledge
that a guilty verdict is less likely to result in the demise of a corporation,
the government would occupy a comparatively modest negotiating posi-
tion.  Of course, reforms that provide for a robust-challenge and mean-
ingful-review regime where either or both is lacking would also
incentivize voluntary disclosure of malfeasance, a circumstance that
should be welcomed by both enforcement agencies and debarring and
exclusion officials.
CONCLUSION
At present, federal corporate crime is punished by a regime that is
relatively suspect from both a penological and a philosophical perspec-
tive, notwithstanding the admirable intentions of those tasked with its
enforcement.  The proposals for reform enumerated within this Article
would do much to remedy the defects inherent in and collateral to a
liability mechanism imported intact from the law of torts.  Through
such improvements, the federal corporate criminal law could become
an efficient yet moral instrument, one that effectively deters corporate
misconduct without compromising our cherished right to a criminal
trial.
116. Garrett, supra note 70, at 112.
35013-nde_28-2 Sheet No. 62 Side A      05/20/2014   11:05:20
35013-nde_28-2 Sheet No. 62 Side B      05/20/2014   11:05:20
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\28-2\NDE204.txt unknown Seq: 24 14-MAY-14 10:42
35013-nde_28-2 Sheet No. 62 Side B      05/20/2014   11:05:20
